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Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen, 
allow  me  to make  a  somewhat  personal  comment 
on  a  subject which  is at least as  important 
in intra-European  terms  as  in terms  of  the 
Atlantic relationship. .· 
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Barring  a  change  of heart by  either the Soviet 
Union  or the United  States comparable  to 
St.  Paul's conversion  on  the  road  to Damascus, 
Pershing  II and  Ground  Launched  Cruise Missiles 
will  shortly make  their long-awaited  and  much-
debated appearance  on  European  soil.  Their 
intended  deployment  will  be  accompanied  by 
demonstrations  of  disapproval  by  large  sections 
of  European  public  opinion.  The  scale,  intensity 
and  duration of  these  demonstrations  remains  a 
question  of  speculation.  But  they will certainly 
be  sufficient to demonstrate  the divisive 
consequences  of  the  NATO  INF  decision,  They 
will also highlight the  irony  that a  decision 
taken~to strengthen confidence  in Alliance 
strategy and  the  American  nuclear guarantee  has 
succeeded  in weakening  public confidence  in both. 
Western  governments will  doubtless  ride  the 
immediate  storm  of protest and  many  Alliance 
officials will breathe a  sigh of relief and 
congratulate  themselves  on  a  job well  done. 
For  them,  deployments will  represent a  moment  of 
triumph,  the Alliance will  have  held firm, 
American  leadership will  have  reasserted itself 0.-, 
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and  Soviet attempts at interference  resoundingly 
defeated,  Yet  this moment  of  self-congratulation 
may  be  short-lived.  Few  but the most  optimistic 
can  hope  that the protest movement  will  die 
away.  For many  of  the anti-nuclear critics, 
the  arrival of  the missiles will  confirm their 
,,  worst fears,  that  the  arms  control  co~ponent 
of  the double  track decision  was  always  a 
convenient cover  for  obtaining  deployments. 
Oth~rs,  less cynical,  will  doubtless  recall  the 
insistence of  Alliance officials that only  if 
NATO  demonstrated  its determination  to deploy  -
would it be  possible  to achieve  an  arms  control 
agreement  and  a  situation of  mutual  restraint. 
That  may  still be  true,  but it will  hardly  be  in 
the  near future  and  the  immediate  consequences 
of  the  new  deployments  may  be  sufficient to 
harden  the opposition  of  the as yet unconvinced 
section of  public opinion.  Given  the likely 
Soviet reactions,  suspending  their participation 
in  the  INF  negotiations and  engaging  in 
reciprocal  deployments  of additional  Soviet 
missiles,  the  public will be  faced  with a"worst 
of all worlds"situation.  Having  been  promised 
arms  control  and  restraint,  they  can  see 
precisely the opposite,  no  arms control  and  a 
continuing  proliferation of  weapons  on  either 
side.  Furthermore,  in  view  of  the current ( ~:  .. 
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rhetoric of  the  Reagan  Administration,  it 
will  be  by  no  means  clear that this situation 
is entirely the  fault of  the Soviet Union. 
INF  will  thus  remain  a  smouldering  issue,  the 
deployed missiles will provide  a  focus  for 
continuing protest and  discontent,  per~ane~t 
reminders  of  failed  promises  and  frustrated 
expectations,  and  most  significantly,  visible 
symbols  of  the  eroding  consensus  of  the  req~ire­
ments  of  Western  defence. 
There  are  those  who  will argue,  of  course,  that 
we  have  nothing  to  worry  about,  that the anti-
nuclear movement  is merely  a  vocifero~s minority 
exercising  its democratic  rights.  In  strictly 
statistical terms,  this view  may  consitute an 
accurate portrayal  of  the  situation.  However, 
1n  my  view,  the peace movement  embraces  too 
large a  cross-section of our societies  to be 
thus  dismissed,  A  substantial  proportion  of 
our  societies is concerned  about current trends 
and policies and  they  should  be  listened to. ('~  :~. 
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For  the  moment,  official wisdom  has  prevailed, 
but my  concern  is the  ~~nner in  which  it has 
prevailed.  What  effect will  the  tactics used 
to  secure deployments  have  upon  future  public 
attitudes  to Western  security  require~ents? 
In  the  coming  months,  what conclusions will 
people  draw  concerning  the credibility and 
sincerity of  our  policies when  they  recall  the 
official message  this  a~tumn which  has  been 
"hang  tough  and all will  be  well  in  the  end". 
This  is a  particularly  serious  issue  because 
from  now  on  any  decision  concerning  ~~clear 
weapons  will  havs  to  take  full  accou~t of  p~blic 
opinion.  What  was  previously  the  private 
preserve of  a  few  officials and  academics,  is 
now  an  issue of  mass  consumption.  This  poses 
an  immediate  problem because  a  strategy based 
on  nuclear deterrence is not easily explained, 
nor are its requirements easily established. 
It is not easy  to persuade people  of  the  need 
for  we~pons whose  use  would  result  to all intents 
and  purposes  in mutual  suicide,  nor  to explain 
the  paradox  that for  weapons  to be credible, 
they must appear to be  usable,  but that usability 
does  not  indicate  the actual  intention  to use 
them. c-,_ 
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Yet despite this complexity,  these are  issues 
with \'lhich  we  must  come  to terms.  No  matter 
how  strong  our aversion, 
and will  remain,  for the 
fact  of  political life. 
nuclear weapons  are, 
forseeable  future,  a 
They  will  continue 
to  be  a  major  element  in  the  super-pm"'er 
relationship and  we  in  Europe  will  continue  to 
live under  the  shadow of,  or  under  the 
protection of,  Soviet and  American  nuclear 
weapons.  We  cannot  therefore  simply  opt out. 
We  can  and  should  work  towards  the  ineal  of  a 
disarmed or non-nuclear world,  but  in  the  mean-
time,  we  must  aim  for  humbler  but equally 
urgent objectives,  notably  the  securing  of  a 
more  stable situation  through  negotiated arms 
control  agreements  which  achieve  lower  levels 
of  forces,  eliminate  unecessarily provocative 
systems  and  create greater mutual  confidence 
on  either side,  But  above all,  we  must 
accommodate  nuclear weapons  in our  security 
policy in a  manner  that commands  public  support 
and  acceptance.  Our  strategy must deter  the 
Soviet Union,  but  in  the current political 
environment it is equally  important that,  to 
quote  Professor Michael  Howard,  ~it reassures 
our own  public  opinion". PARL.!MENT  EUROP~EN 
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In  achieving  such  a  security policy,  the 
question of  INF  will  continue  to play  a  central 
role.  What  then  are  the  lessons  that can  be 
drawn  from  the  INF  decision? 
In  looking  back at the origin  and  development 
of  the  INF  decision,  one  can  speculate endlessly 
on  the details of  the decision  - on  the  choice 
of  land-based missiles,  the  selection  of  a 
cruise and  Pershing  rni~,  the  number  of  572 
and  so  on.  But  in  terms  of  developing  a 
security policy  that will  co~~and the  support 
and  confidence  of  the  majority of  our citizens 
I  believe  several  concl'..!sions  can be  drawn. 
Firstly  1  we  must  ensure  that our means - the 
capabilities that we  seek- are proportionate to 
our ends.- our politieal objectives.  In 
evaluating  our military  requirements  we  must 
always  maintain  a  sense of  perspective,  in 
particular we  should avoid  an  obsessive 
preoccupationwith  imbalances  in  specific 
categories  of  systems.  In view of  the nature 
of nuclear  we~pon$ and  the  numbers  available to 
either side,  the  demand  for  balance at all 
levels is both  futile  and  in  terms  of  public PARLEMENT  EUROP~EN 
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opinion,  counter-productive.  In  1977,  Alliance 
officials concluded  that the  Soviet leadership 
would  detect a  gap  in our capabilities,  yet 
common  sense  said  that  such  a  gap  - even  if it 
existed - was  hardly exploitable  in  any  meaningful 
sense  of  the word.  Yet  our  preoccupation with 
closing  imaginary  gaps  led us  to  seek  an 
additional  margin  of  insurance  that not only 
was  militarily  unecessary,  but whose  political 
cost  in  terms of Alliance cohesion,  has  far 
outweighed  any  conceivable gain  in deterrence. 
INF  modernisation  represented  a  degree  of  fine 
tuning  to  our  strategy that was  possible when 
security was  the  preserve  of  a  small  elite of 
officials and  academics,  but  such  changes 
become  more difficult to  justify under  the more 
basic  common  sense  approach  of  public  opinion. (
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It is also  important  to  ensure  that military 
requirements  are consistent with political 
and  economic  circumstances.  Far  too  frequently, 
requirements  and capabilities evolve  from 
scenarios  which  have little to  do  with political 
reality.  In  this  respect,  much  has  been  made  of 
the  SS-20,  which  has  become  the  scourge of 
Europe.  A  system  whose  obvious  function  was  to 
replace obsolete and  unstable  systems  has 
become  a  system  designed  specifically for  the 
purpose  of  decoupling  Europe  from  the  United 
States.  Use  oi the  threatened  use  of  the  SS-20 
would,  it is said,  reduce  Europe  to  a  condition 
of  subservience.  In  the  words  of  the  London 
"Economist":  "Until  there  is a  counter  to Russia's 
SS-20,  these  weapons  will tilt Western  European 
to  a  choice  between  submission  and obliteration." 
Yet  in  the real world what conceivable political 
or military gain could be  achieved  through  the 
use of  the ss-20,  except  the  effective destruction 
of Europe  as  we  know  it, and  the potential  risk 
of global nuclear war?  In  other words,  mutual 
suicide.  And  if the  system cannot be  used  in (
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any  meaningful  way,  then  suggestions  of  blackmail 
or  intimidation are  likewise devoid of  meaning 
or substance  .• 
All  of  this argues  for  the  development  of  a 
security policy  that avoids  a  dependence  on 
''-,  worst case  scenarios,  assesses our military 
requirements within  the  appropriate political 
and  economic  context  and  ensures  that  these 
requirements  are consistent with  our  political 
objectives.  It should  also  be  accompanied  by 
a  determination  to limit  the capabilities on 
either side  through  a  credible  and balanced  arms 
control policy. 
In  this  respect,  our  experience with  INF  is 
also instructive.  From  the  beginning,  the 
credibility of  our position with  regard  to  INF 
arms  control  negotiations has  suffered from  the 
apparent lack of  enthusiasm of  the  Reagan 
Administration  towards  the  arms  control  process. 
It was  the  Administration's initial reluctance 
which  meant  that  the  INF  negotiations  commenced 
in total  isolation of  negotiations  on  strategic 
arms.  Given  the  public  mood  at the  time,  it 
is understandable  that governments  sought  to (' 
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distract attention  from  the modernisation 
decision  by  emphasising  their willingness  to 
pursue  arms  control.  However,  whatever  the 
motivation,  the direct coupling  of modernisation 
and  arms  control  was  a  mistake as it has  made 
either component  hostage  to  the  other  in a 
fashion  that has  been counter-productive. 
Emphasis  on  the  arms  control  approach  has 
produced  a  requirement for numerical  parity 
which  is directly counter  to  the principal 
~ationale underlying  the modernisation  decision. 
It has  also  increased  the  tendency  to concentrate 
on  the  SS-20  and  even  to  suggest that via  the 
zero option  arms  control  could  provide  an  answer 
to NATO's  problems.  A  logic  that again  ran 
directly counter to that present in  the modern-
isation decision.  These  and  other contradictions, 
all born  from  confusion over what  we  really 
require,have  tended  to undermine  the credibility 
of our negotiating position, -----------------------------------
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Finally,  the  search for Alliance solidarity 
should not  be  allowed  to  run  roughshod  over 
national differences and  impose  policies  in 
the  name  of  Alliance unity  that could  undermine 
public  support both for defence  and Alliance 
membership  in  the  longer  term.  Solidarity 
of  purpose  is  important,  but  each  nation 
contributes  to  the collective defence  in its 
own  particular way.  We  should  remember  that 
the  very diversity  of. the Alliance which 
sometimes  impedes  collective decisions  is 
one  of  its major  strengths. PARUMENT EUROPt!N 
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The  most  in~eresting consequence  of the  INF 
issue has  been  that it has  highlighted the  need 
for  Europeans  to begin  to coordinate  a  unified 
and  independent  review of their security 
'~- requirements.  This  development  has  been 
stimulated  from  several directions but its most 
pressing objective is the diminishing  public 
consensus  on  defence.  A  predominant  theme  in 
the anti-nuclear debate  is the  some•.vhat 
inaccurate  sentiment that Alliance policies, 
particularly nuclear,  are dictated to  the 
Europeans  by  the  United  Stat~s.  This  belief, 
accompanied  by  widespread unease with  the 
rhetoric of  the  Reagan  Administration has 
produced considerable criticism of  the  American 
role  in  the Alliance.  Many  Europeans  want  to 
feel  that they  have  a  greater  say  in their own 
destinies  than  now  appears to be  the case. 
Public  concern  in this respect could be 
satisfied if Alliance policies were  seen  to be 
influenced more  visibly by  European  interests 
and  objectives. ·;· ..  '€'' 
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To  those  familiar with  the  origins of  the  INF 
modernisation  decision,  these thoughts  may  seem 
somewhat  ironic as it was  European  concern 
that first set the  INF  process  in  motion. 
However,  as  I  have  made  clear earlier,  the 
initial rationale for  IXF  modernisation  was 
articulat~d by  a  relatively  small  group  of 
officials who  took  little account of  the 
political consequences  of  their decisions. 
I  suggest  that  in  the  ~uch  manged political 
and  strategic  environ~ent of  today,  the 
question  asked  in  1977  \•:ould  receive  very 
different answers.  In  view of  the drastically 
changed conditions  I  believe  Europeans  should 
begin  to move  towards  a  process  where  they 
can  form  an  independent assessment  of  their 
security  requirements,  particularly the degree 
and  type  of coupling  to  the United States. 
The  need  for greater coordination  in European 
thinking extends across  the security  spectrum. 
A  new  debate  is currently under way  within  the 
Alliance,  partly as  a  result of  the anti-
nuclear movement,  on  the possibility of 
reducing  our reliance  on  nuclear weapons  through 
improvements  in conventional  forces  and 
through parallel reductions  in the  number  of PARLEMI!NT iUAOPlEN 
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tactical nuclear warheads  in  Europe.  However, 
we  should  beware of  false  prophets as neither 
development will necessarily  have  any  impact 
on  the  so-called nuclear  threshold. 
As  yet,  there are  too  many  questionable 
assumptions  and  too  many  unans~.;ered questions 
to olace much  confidence  in  these  prooosals  - ..  ~  -
for  example,  Poland,  when  General  Rogers  says 
that under current conditions,  he  ~ould have  to 
request  the  release of  nuclear weapons  at an 
early  stage of  any  conflict,  on  what  scenario 
is this calculation based?  Knowing  the 
dif!iculty of  satisfying  the military's 
definition of  adequate  forces,  how  would  we 
know  when  we  had  reached  the  point  in  our 
capabilities at which  the  nuclear  threshold 
had  been  raised?  And  does  the  reduction  in 
the  numbers  of  nuclear warheads  make  any 
difference  to the  time at which  nuclear weapons 
would  be  used? 
Furthermore,  proposals  to  improve  conventional 
capabilities through  new  technology  beg 
awkward  questions,  such  as  the  reliability, 
availability and cost of  new  systems.  More  than ----l--~--------------------------- ----·-·-
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anything,  they  avoid  the question  of  acceptability, 
Improvements  in conventional  forces  are 
obviously desirable but  they  must  be  made  in 
ways  that are compatible with  the defensive 
orientation of  our Alliance  and consistent 
with  our political objectives  of  achieving 
stability through  increased mutual  confidence. 
These  requirements  suggest  that any  improvement 
will  come  through  steady  incremental  change 
rather  than  dra~atic, highly visible changes  in 
emphasis.  The  problem is whether  steady 
incrementalism will  satisfy the political 
imperative  to  "do  something  about  the  r.uclear 
threshold".  These  are all  issues  that are 
central  to  the future  o:  European  security and 
on  which  Europeans  should  begin  to develop 
and  articulate independent  thought. 
Apart  from  the  need  to secure  public  support for 
defence,  the  requirement  that Europe  should 
develop  a  more  independent  approach  has  other 
motivations,  most notably  a  need  to address 
the growing  friction within  the Atlantic 
relationship and  to provide a  moderating 
influence  on  the  rapidly deteriorating 
relationship between  the  two  super-powers. PAALEMENT  EUROP!!N 
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It has  long  been  apparent that there are serious 
differences  between  the  United  States  and 
Europe  over  a  broad  range  of  issues,  particularly 
on  the appropriate policies  the  ~'lest  should be 
following  towards  the  Soviet  Union.  A 
collecti~e and  coherent European  voice  could 
help  in both  respects.  An  evident willingness 
by  Europeans  to  adopt greater responsibility 
for  their own  security could greatly help 
offset  the  growing  trend  towards  isolationism 
in  the  United States,  particularly  in  the 
Congress.  A coordinated  European  view would 
certainly stand  ~ore chance  of  influencing 
US  policies  than  the present  fragmented  approach. 
The  political and  institutional obstacles  that 
currently inhibit such  a  development are,  of 
course,  formidable,  and  need  no  reiteration here. 
However,  at the public level,  developments  in 
this direction are already discernible.  Indeed, 
the  existence of  the  peace movement  itself 
represents the determination that European 
security policy must  respond  to European 
perspectives and  to  European  requirements.  Even 
within  the  European Community  itself, despite r-. 
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considerable opposition,  there are glimmerings 
of  hope,  as  the  process  known  as  European 
Political Co-operation gradually  intensifies 
and  extends  its  scope.  The  European 
-,  Parliament itself is also playing  an  important 
role  in developing  public consciousness  of  the 
need  for  a  European  dimension  to  security 
policy.  Recognition by  the  Parliament of  the 
need for  a  West  European  secur:ty concept  is 
only  a  small  step,  but  nevert~aless it 
demonstrates  that awareness  is growing.  No 
grand  initiative could  institutionalise 
West  European  security  overnig~t.  Rather,  it 
will be  achieved  through  a  series of  small, 
pragmatic steps,  all of  which  ~ill create 
among  West  European  a  consciousness of,  and 
ultimately a  willingness to accept, 
responsibil~ty for  their own  security. 